Note that these sites search databases and/or use rainbow tables to find a suitable string that produces the hash in question but one can't definitively guarantee what string originally produced the hash. This is an important distinction. Suppose that you want to crack someone's password, where the hash of the password is stored on the server. Indeed, all you then need is a string that produces the correct hash and you're in! However, you cannot prove that you have discovered the user's password, only a "duplicate key."
In cryptography, size does matter. The larger the key, the harder it is to crack a block of encrypted data. The reason that large keys offer more protection is almost obvious; computers have made it easier to attack ciphertext by using brute force methods rather than by attacking the mathematics (which are generally well-known anyway). With a brute force attack, the attacker merely generates every possible key and applies it to the ciphertext. Any resulting plaintext that makes sense offers a candidate for a legitimate key. This was the basis, of course, of the EFF's attack on DES.
Bitcoin Bar 1.0 Crack
There is, however, a significant weakness to this system. Specifically, the response is generated in such a way as to effectively reduce 16-byte hash to three smaller hashes, of length seven, seven, and two, respectively. Thus, a password cracker has to break at most a 7-byte hash. One Windows NT vulnerability test program that I used in the past reported passwords that were "too short," defined as "less than 8 characters." When I asked how the program knew that passwords were too short, the software's salespeople suggested to me that the program broke the passwords to determine their length. This was, in fact, not the case at all; all the software really had to do was to look at the last eight bytes of the Windows NT LanMan hash to see that the password was seven or fewer characters.
The second DES Challenge II lasted less than 3 days. On July 17, 1998, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) announced the construction of hardware that could brute-force a DES key in an average of 4.5 days. Called Deep Crack, the device could check 90 billion keys per second and cost only about $220,000 including design (it was erroneously and widely reported that subsequent devices could be built for as little as $50,000). Since the design is scalable, this suggests that an organization could build a DES cracker that could break 56-bit keys in an average of a day for as little as $1,000,000. Information about the hardware design and all software can be obtained from the EFF.
The Deep Crack algorithm is actually quite interesting. The general approach that the DES Cracker Project took was not to break the algorithm mathematically but instead to launch a brute-force attack by guessing every possible key. A 56-bit key yields 256, or about 72 quadrillion, possible values. So the DES cracker team looked for any shortcuts they could find! First, they assumed that some recognizable plaintext would appear in the decrypted string even though they didn't have a specific known plaintext block. They then applied all 256 possible key values to the 64-bit block (I don't mean to make this sound simple!). The system checked to see if the decrypted value of the block was "interesting," which they defined as bytes containing one of the alphanumeric characters, space, or some punctuation. Since the likelihood of a single byte being "interesting" is about , then the likelihood of the entire 8-byte stream being "interesting" is about 8, or 1/65536 (16). This dropped the number of possible keys that might yield positive results to about 240, or about a trillion.
In March 2016, the SSL DROWN (Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption) attack was announced. DROWN works by exploiting the presence of SSLv2 to crack encrypted communications and steal information from Web servers, email servers, or VPN sessions. You might have read above that SSLv2 fell out of use by the early 2000s and was formally deprecated in 2011. This is true. But backward compatibility often causes old software to remain dormant and it seems that up to one-third of all HTTPS sites at the time were vulnerable to DROWN because SSLv2 had not been removed or disabled.
Having nothing to do with TrueCrypt, but having something to do with plausible deniability and devious crypto schemes, is a new approach to holding password cracking at bay dubbed Honey Encryption. With most of today's crypto systems, decrypting with a wrong key produces digital gibberish while a correct key produces something recognizable, making it easy to know when a correct key has been found. Honey Encryption produces fake data that resembles real data for every key that is attempted, making it significantly harder for an attacker to determine whether they have the correct key or not; thus, if an attacker has a credit card file and tries thousands of keys to crack it, they will obtain thousands of possibly legitimate credit card numbers. See "'Honey Encryption' Will Bamboozle Attackers with Fake Secrets" (Simonite) for some general information or "Honey Encryption: Security Beyond the Brute-Force Bound" (Juels & Ristenpart) for a detailed paper.
As a slight aside, another way that people try to prove that their new crypto scheme is a good one without revealing the mathematics behind it is to provide a public challenge where the author encrypts a message and promises to pay a sum of money to the first person — if any — who cracks the message. Ostensibly, if the message is not decoded, then the algorithm must be unbreakable. As an example, back in 2011, a $10,000 challenge page for a new crypto scheme called DioCipher was posted and scheduled to expire on 1 January 2013 — which it did. That was the last that I heard of DioCipher. I leave it to the reader to consider the validity and usefulness of the public challenge process.
There are several Discord servers that host discussions relating to cracking. Some Discord servers serve as official channels attached to online cracking communities such as Nulled or even as a spillover community for darknet market users. Many of these servers host discussions related to broader hacking topics, including cracking, while some are specific to them. Many of these communities serve as a platform for vendors to sell custom configs, combo lists, and tools for the purpose of account takeover.
OpenBullet has its own dedicated forum, which offers the latest version of the tool for download but cautions that it is not a cracking forum. There are several cracking tutorials on YouTube, cracking communities, and other hacking forums that instruct users on how to use the tool for the purpose of unauthorized account takeover.
In one cracking community, a user commented that OpenBullet is better than Sentry MBA and SNIPR because their configuration files are outdated, and that few make configuration files for these tools anymore. While configs for Sentry MBA, SNIPR, and other well-known tools can still be found within cracking communities, there is a new and noticeable trend for OpenBullet configs as well. OpenBullet configs for services such as Netflix, Microsoft Azure, IMVU, Scribd and other services are for sale on cracking forums.
Like Sentry MBA and other tools, custom configs and URL inputs can be found being traded and sold within cracking communities for the purpose of account cracking. Common targets for Private Keeper seem to include popular online video games and streaming services.
These tools are coded using a multitude of different tools, or may include mods to existing tools. They are frequently seen for sale or trade on popular dark markets or within online cracking communities.
ASA Version 9.1(3)!hostname Nine23ASAdomain-name WORKGROUPenable password 8Ry2YjIyt7RRXU24 encryptednamesip local pool VPN_POOL_1 192.168.0.10-192.168.0.25 mask 255.255.255.0ip local pool POOL_SUBNET_2 192.168.10.0-192.168.10.20 mask 255.255.255.0!interface Ethernet00 switchport access vlan 2!interface Ethernet01!interface Ethernet02!interface Ethernet03!interface Ethernet04!interface Ethernet05!interface Ethernet06!interface Ethernet07!interface Vlan1 nameif inside security-level 100 ip address 192.168.0.254 255.255.255.0!interface Vlan2 nameif outside security-level 0 ip address xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 255.255.255.248!ftp mode passivedns domain-lookup insidedns domain-lookup outsidedns server-group DefaultDNS name-server 8.8.8.8 name-server 8.8.4.4 domain-name WORKGROUPobject network 192.168.0.234 host 192.168.0.234 description Training Web Serverobject network 192.168.0.248 host 192.168.0.248 description FTP1 Serverobject network 192.168.0.238 host 192.168.0.238 description MobileIron Applianceobject network network_obj_public_ip_2 host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx description Secondary Public IP Addressobject network object_outside_pat subnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 description Inside to Outside PATobject network NETWORK_OBJ_192.168.0.0_27 subnet 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.224object-group network network_obj_group_ftpservers description Network Object Group containing FTP Servers network-object object 192.168.0.248object-group network network_obj_group_webservers description Network Object Group containing Web Servers network-object object 192.168.0.234object-group service tcp_service_group_MobileIron_Ports tcp description Service Object Group containing MobileIron ports port-object eq 8080 port-object eq 9997 port-object eq 9998 port-object eq www port-object eq httpsaccess-list outside_access_in remark Access rule that permits inbound FTP access to FTP serversaccess-list outside_access_in extended permit tcp any object-group network_obj_group_ftpservers eq ftpaccess-list outside_access_in remark Access rule permits inbound HTTP access to Web Serversaccess-list outside_access_in extended permit tcp any object-group network_obj_group_webservers eq wwwaccess-list outside_access_in remark Access rule that permits inbound access to MobileIronaccess-list outside_access_in extended permit tcp any object 192.168.0.238 object-group tcp_service_group_MobileIron_Portsaccess-list Nine23_VPN_5_splitTunnelAcl standard permit 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0access-list Nine23_VPN_1_splitTunnelAcl standard permit 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0access-list Nine23_VPN_5_splitTunnelAcl_1 standard permit 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0pager lines 24logging asdm informationalmtu inside 1500mtu outside 1500no failovericmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1no asdm history enablearp timeout 14400no arp permit-nonconnectednat (inside,inside) source static any any destination static NETWORK_OBJ_192.168.0.0_27 NETWORK_OBJ_192.168.0.0_27 no-proxy-arp route-lookup!object network 192.168.0.234 nat (inside,outside) static interface service tcp www wwwobject network 192.168.0.248 nat (inside,outside) static interface service tcp ftp ftpobject network 192.168.0.238 nat (inside,outside) static network_obj_public_ip_2object network object_outside_pat nat (inside,outside) dynamic interfaceaccess-group outside_access_in in interface outsideroute outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx 1timeout xlate 30000timeout pat-xlate 00030timeout conn 10000 half-closed 01000 udp 00200 icmp 00002timeout sunrpc 01000 h323 00500 h225 10000 mgcp 00500 mgcp-pat 00500timeout sip 03000 sip_media 00200 sip-invite 00300 sip-disconnect 00200timeout sip-provisional-media 00200 uauth 00500 absolutetimeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 00100timeout floating-conn 00000dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicyuser-identity default-domain LOCALaaa authentication ssh console LOCALaaa authentication http console LOCALhttp server enablehttp 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 insidehttp 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 insidesnmp-server host outside xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx communitysnmp-server host outside xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx communitysnmp-server host outside xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx communityno snmp-server locationno snmp-server contactsnmp-server enable traps snmp authentication linkup linkdown coldstart warmstartcrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-256-MD5 esp-aes-256 esp-md5-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-DES-SHA esp-des esp-sha-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-3DES-SHA esp-3des esp-sha-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-DES-MD5 esp-des esp-md5-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-192-MD5 esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-3DES-MD5 esp-3des esp-md5-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-256-SHA esp-aes-256 esp-sha-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-128-SHA esp-aes esp-sha-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-192-SHA esp-aes-192 esp-sha-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-128-MD5 esp-aes esp-md5-hmaccrypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 protocol esp encryption aes-256 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES192 protocol esp encryption aes-192 protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES protocol esp encryption aes protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal 3DES protocol esp encryption 3des protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5crypto ipsec ikev2 ipsec-proposal DES protocol esp encryption des protocol esp integrity sha-1 md5crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinitecrypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set pfscrypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES-128-SHA ESP-AES-128-MD5 ESP-AES-192-SHA ESP-AES-192-MD5 ESP-AES-256-SHA ESP-AES-256-MD5 ESP-3DES-SHA ESP-3DES-MD5 ESP-DES-SHA ESP-DES-MD5crypto dynamic-map SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAP 65535 set ikev2 ipsec-proposal AES256 AES192 AES 3DES DEScrypto map outside_map 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAPcrypto map outside_map interface outsidecrypto map inside_map 65535 ipsec-isakmp dynamic SYSTEM_DEFAULT_CRYPTO_MAPcrypto map inside_map interface insidecrypto ca trustpool policycrypto ikev2 policy 1 encryption aes-256 integrity sha group 5 2 prf sha lifetime seconds 86400crypto ikev2 policy 10 encryption aes-192 integrity sha group 5 2 prf sha lifetime seconds 86400crypto ikev2 policy 20 encryption aes integrity sha group 5 2 prf sha lifetime seconds 86400crypto ikev2 policy 30 encryption 3des integrity sha group 5 2 prf sha lifetime seconds 86400crypto ikev2 policy 40 encryption des integrity sha group 5 2 prf sha lifetime seconds 86400crypto ikev1 policy 10 authentication crack encryption aes-256 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 20 authentication rsa-sig encryption aes-256 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 30 authentication pre-share encryption aes-256 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 40 authentication crack encryption aes-192 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 50 authentication rsa-sig encryption aes-192 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 60 authentication pre-share encryption aes-192 hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 70 authentication crack encryption aes hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 80 authentication rsa-sig encryption aes hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 90 authentication pre-share encryption aes hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 100 authentication crack encryption 3des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 110 authentication rsa-sig encryption 3des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 120 authentication pre-share encryption 3des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 130 authentication crack encryption des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 140 authentication rsa-sig encryption des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400crypto ikev1 policy 150 authentication pre-share encryption des hash sha group 2 lifetime 86400telnet timeout 5ssh 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 insidessh 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 insidessh timeout 5ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1console timeout 0 2ff7e9595c
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